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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the denial of an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
Appellant Kirk Loftis asks this Court to vacate the felony judgment, reverse the denial of his 
motion and remand for imposition of a misdemeanor sentence with credit for time served. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
Mr. Loftis was charged by Information with a single count of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child. CR 21 1• The Information alleged, in pertinent part: 
CR21. 
KIRK A LOFTIS is/are accused by this Information of the crime(s) of: 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, FELONY, I.C. 
§18-903, 918(7)(b) which crime(s) was/were committed as follows: 
That the Defendant, KIRK A. LOFTIS, on or about the 1st day of October, 
2003, in the County of Ada, State ofldaho, did actually, intentionally and 
unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of Kim Richards, to wit: by 
punching the victim in the face and head, pulling her by her hair and strangling 
her by the neck, while in the presence of a child, to wit,  R. four ( 4) years 
old, and where Kim Richards and the Defendant are household members. 
According to the evidence presented at trial, Mr. Loftis and Ms. Kim Richards had been 
sharing part of a duplex. They moved in on August 19, 2003, and together signed a lease. T 
p. 13, ln. 7-13. 
On Friday, September 21, 2003, Ms. Richards asked Mr. Loftis to move out because he 
was no longer employed. She told him that she would be gone for the weekend and asked him to 
1 This Court took judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript in State 
v. Loftis, No. 31102 by order dated May 2, 2012. The original clerk's record will be cited as 
"CR." The limited clerk's record prepared for this appeal will be cited as "LCR." "T" refers to 
the transcripts of the trial proceedings in Docket No. 31102. 
leave before she returned. He was still there on Sunday when she returned, but he moved out that 
day, taking his things and some of hers with him. T p. 15, ln. 8 - p. 16, ln. 13. 
Over the next week, Ms. Richards and Mr. Loftis had discussions which culminated in 
him returning to the house. He brought most of his things back and moved them back into the 
duplex on the Monday preceding October 1, 2003. T p. 17, ln. 3-16. 
On Wednesday, October 1, Ms. Richards wrote Mr. Loftis a series of e-mails telling him 
good-bye and that their relationship was over. She also came home during her lunch-break and 
told him to be out of the house by the time she got off work. T p. 19, ln. 11-17. 
At the end of that work day, Ms. Richards and her four-year-old daughter  
returned to the duplex where Mr. Loftis was asleep on the bed. T p. 20, ln. 12-13. 
Ms. Richards went into the bedroom, put on the light and told Mr. Loftis that she knew he 
had been unfaithful to her and that she wanted him to leave. An argument ensued, which 
escalated from being verbal to being physical. Ms. Richards testified that Mr. Loftis hit her, 
wrestled with her, pulled her hair, choked her, pushed her, and the like. During this, according to 
Ms. Richards, she grabbed her daughter and attempted to leave the duplex. Mr. Loftis initially 
tried to block her path, but eventually she and her daughter left and got into her car. T p. 21, ln. 
14 - p. 29, ln. 21. 
According to Ms. Richards, Mr. Loftis followed her to the car where he again hit her and 
tried to grab her keys. A neighbor saw this and called 911. T p. 31, ln. 1-7. 
Before the police arrived, Mr. Loftis grabbed some of his things and left in his truck. T p. 
32, ln. 12-13. 
Ms. Richards testified that as a result of all this she had bruising on and behind her ears, a 
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swollen jaw, and bruising around her eye and on her chin and arm. T p. 33, ln. 25 - pg. 34, ln. 8. 
Following this testimony and that of a police officer and the neighbor who called the 
police, Mr. Loftis was convicted. T p. 151, ln. 11-17. 
Mr. Loftis was sentenced to a term of twenty years with ten years fixed. CR 79. A 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed. CR 86. 
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Loftis, 2007 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 349, Docket No. 31003 (Ct. App. 2007), review denied. The Court of Appeals 
rejected Mr. Loftis's argument under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) and Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,316 (1979), that the state had not proved that he and Ms. Richards were 
household members at the time of the incident. The Court of Appeals found they were household 
members because they were cohabitating under the definition of cohabitation found in State v. 
Hansell, 141 Idaho 587,590, 114 P.3d 145, 148 (Ct. App. 2005). Hansell held that two people 
were cohabitants (and thus "household members") if they lived together.2 He also argued that the 
jury instructions omitted a material element of the offense, i.e., that he "willfully" inflicted a 
traumatic injury in violation of State v. Hansell, supra;3 State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 506, 80 
2 That portion of Hansell was overruled last year in State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867, 
264 P.3d 970, 974 (2011): "The holding in Hansell, on which the State heavily relies, does not 
affect our conclusion because it is an incorrect reading of the statute and, in any event, decisions 
of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court." Id. Thus, today, the Court of Appeals 
would have vacated the judgment here and remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment of 
conviction for misdemeanor battery. 
3 This portion of Hansell was not at issue in Schulz. The requirement that the defendant 
willfully inflict a traumatic injury was deleted from the statute after Hansell was decided. 2005 
Idaho Sessions Laws, ch. 158, § p. 488. The amendment, of course, did not apply to this case 
due to ex post.facto considerations. ID. Const., Art. 1, § 16; See, Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 3 86, 
391, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). 
,, 
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P.3d 1103, 1107 (Ct. App. 2003), and State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458, 95 P.3d 76 (Ct. App. 2004), 
review denied. The Court of Appeals found this error to be harmless. State v. Loftis, supra. Mr. 
Loftis's petition for review was denied. 
He then timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. That petition was denied by the 
district court and that denial was affirmed on appeal. Loftis v. State, 2011 Unpublished Opinion 
518 (Ct. App. 2011), Docket No. 35376, review denied. 
On December 19, 2011, Mr. Loftis filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under 
I.C.R. 35(a) and a brief in support of the motion. LCR 7-8; 9-13. In his brief, Mr. Loftis 
correctly noted that"[ n ]o person can be punished for a public offense except upon a legal 
conviction in a court having jurisdiction thereof." LCR 10, quoting I.C. § 19-101. He went on to 
argue that the charging document in the case was insufficient to confer felony jurisdiction on the 
district court and all he was charged with was misdemeanor simple battery under LC. §18-903. 
LCR 10-11. He also alerted the court to this Court's opinion in State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252 
P.3d 1255 (2011), where the Court wrote "where it is apparent from the record that the act that 
the defendant was criminally convicted for is not a crime according to the laws of this state, this 
court has the authority to vacate the conviction sua sponte ... "Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d 
at 1258, quoting State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,484, 80 P.3d 1083, 1085 (2003). LCR 11. 
The state's total response to this was as follows: 
I 
The sentence is within the statutory parameters and is not illegal. 
II 
To the extent the Defendant wants to quibble about semantics, he is untimely. 
4 
This Court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of the crime whether it be 
labeled "violence" or "battery." If he has an issue about the jury instructions, he 
needed to take that up on appeal of his conviction. 
LCR 14-15. 
The court denied the motion reasoning as follows: 
The maximum sentence for committing Domestic Violence in the Presence of a 
Child is twenty (20) years. LC. § 18-918(2), ( 4 ). Thus, Mr. Loftis' s twenty-year 
sentence is fixed within the limits of the statute, and the sentence does not need to 
be corrected. 
To the extent that Mr. Loftis challenging his conviction on the basis that it was 
improperly titled, his argument is frivolous. Section 18-918 is clearly titled 
"Domestic Violence." To the extent that Mr. Loftis is challenging the 
constitutionality of his conviction, his arguments are untimely. 
LCR 16. 
This appeal timely followed. LCR 18. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the court have subject-matter jurisdiction to impose judgment for a felony? 
2. Was the twenty-year sentence imposed illegal due to the lack of jurisdiction when the 
charging document can only be construed as charging a misdemeanor? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
Article I, § 8 of the Idaho Constitution states that "[ n Jo person shall be held to answer for 
any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury 
or on information of the public prosecutor[.]" Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case is 
4 In addition to being non-responsive to Mr. Loftis' s jurisdictional argument, the state's 
argument is factually incorrect. The Court of Appeals found that the district court had not 
correctly instructed the jury on the elements of the crime, but that the error was harmless. 
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conferred by the filing of an information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was 
committed within the State ofidaho. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 
701-02 (2004). 
The claim that an information fails to charge an offense and was jurisdictionally deficient 
can be raised at any time, including in an I.C.R. 35 motion, and even for the first time on appeal. 
See I.C.R. 12(b)(2); State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294,300, 1 P.3d 795, 801(2000); State v. Cahoon, 
116 Idaho 399, 400, 775 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1989); see also State v. Lute, supra Gurisdictional 
challenge raised for the first time in a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence). While the 
failure of an information to charge an offense is never waived, defects "which are tardily 
challenged are liberally construed in favor of validity." Cahoon, 116 Idaho at 400, 775 P.2d at 
1242. When a challenge to the information is not raised before trial, the charging document will 
"be upheld unless it is so defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge 
an offense for which the defendant is convicted." Id. A "reviewing court has considerable 
leeway to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the Information." State v. Jones, 
140 Idaho at 758-59, 101 P.3d at 702-03, quoting State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285,287,805 P.2d 
491,493 (Ct. App. 1991). 
B. Why the Sentence is Illegal 
A tardily-challenged Information must allege at least one of the following two things in 
order to be found to confer jurisdiction: 1) the correct code section; or 2) facts constituting the 
crime charged. State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006). This 
is one of those rare cases where the information, even under its most liberal construction, fails to 
allege either of those and thus does not charge a felony offense. Consequently, it did not confer 
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subject-matter jurisdiction on the court for anything other than a misdemeanor offense and the 
twenty-year sentence imposed is illegal. 5 
1. The Information does not allege the correct code section 
In Jones and Cahoon, the Court held that when an objection to a charging document is 
not made until after the entry of judgment, if the applicable code section is named in the charging 
document, its language may be read into the text of the charge. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758-59, 101 
P.3d at 702-03; Cahoon, 116 Idaho at 400, 775 P.2d at 1242. In those cases, however, the 
charging document named the applicable code section under which the defendant was charged. 
In this case, the correct code section was never named. The Information alleged a violation of 
"I.C. § 18-903, 918(7)(b )[.]" CR 21. Section 903 of Title 18 is the general battery statute. In 
October of 2003, Section 918(3) of Title 18 was the felony domestic violence statute6 and 
Section 9 l 8(7)(b) was a penalty enhancement provision. Thus, the state failed to name the 
applicable code section for felony domestic battery in 2003 - I. C. § 918(3) and the rule in 
Jones and Cahoon mentioned above does not save the Information. 
2. The Information does not allege all the facts necessary to 
constitute the charge 
At the time of the offense, the state was required to prove that Mr. Loftis and Kim 
Richards were "household members," that Mr. Loftis committed "a battery, as defined in section 
5 In State v. Murray, supra, the state argued that, under the liberal construction standards, 
the mere pleading of the correct name of the crime should suffice to impart jurisdiction. The 
Court of Appeals did not adopt that position, writing that "[ w ]e do not necessarily disagree with 
that argument, but we conclude that even if embraced by this Court, it could not rescue this 
prosecution." Id. Since Murray, there has been no case, to Mr. Loftis's knowledge, adopting the 
state's argument. 
6 Now renumbered as§ 18-918(2). 2009 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 80, § 3, p. 221. 
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18-903, Idaho Code, and lthat he] willfully and unlawfully inflict[ed] a traumatic injury." I.C. § 
18-918(3) (2003). The Information, however, omitted the willfulness element and only alleged 
that he "did actually, intentionally and unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of 
Kim Richards, to wit: by punching the victim in the face and head, pulling her by her hair and 
strangling her by the neck ... where Kim Richards and the defendant are household members." 
CR 21-22. These allegations are insufficient to charge an offense because the statute in 2003 
required the specific intent to cause a traumatic injury. State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458,460, 95 
P.3d 76, 78 (Ct. App. 2004)7. The Court wrote that "[iJn order for Sohm to be found guilty of 
domestic battery, the state was required to prove not only that he committed a battery but also 
that he willfully inflicted a traumatic injury upon another household member. LC.§ 18-918(3)." 
(Emphasis in original.) Additionally, willfulness was found to be a ''material element of the 
offense." Id. All the Information here alleges is a general intent offense, i.e., that Mr. Loftis 
intentionally committed a battery. Thus, the total failure to allege a material element of the 
offense did not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the court. 
Mr. Loftis draws the Court's attention to the fact that a similar jurisdictional argument 
was made in Sohm. In that case, the information alleged as follows: 
BUDDY SOHM is accused by this information of the crime of: DOMESTIC 
BATTERY, Idaho Code§ 18-918(3), committed as follows, to wit: That the said 
BUDDY SOHM, in POCATELLO, in the County of Bannock, State of Idaho, on 
or about the 11th DAY OF May, 2002, did inflict a traumatic injury upon another 
household member, VICKI HEGG, by striking her in the face and body resulting 
in traumatic injury. 
State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho at 459, 95 P.3d at 77. The Court of Appeals concluded "that the 
7 As recognized in State v. Murray, 143 Idaho at 535-36, 148 P.3d at 1281-82, Sohm was 
modified by this Court on other grounds in State v. Jones 140 Idaho 755, l 01 P.3d 699. 
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language of the information alleging that Sohm struck Hegg in the face and body resulting in 
traumatic injury, when liberally construed, adequately alleges the elements of the crime for which 
Sohm was convicted." Id. The reasoning in that case, however, is unsound and should not be 
followed. The first problem with Sohm is that it found the use of the word "striking" in the 
charge raised "the clear inference ... ofrepeated blows." But that is not the case, as even a 
liberal reading of "striking her in the head and body" connotes two, not multiple, blows. 
"Repeatedly striking" would be the phrase used if multiple blows were being alleged. 
The Court of Appeals then compounds its error by concluding that "[t]he fact that the 
blows were repeated further underscores the implication that an intent to cause traumatic injury 
informed Sohm's actions." Id. Neither the major premise (i.e., that the word "striking" implies 
repeated blows), nor the minor premise (i.e., that repeated blows implies a specific intent to 
cause a traumatic injury) are correct. Obviously, a person could strike someone repeatedly 
without having the specific intent to cause any injury, much less a traumatic injury. 
Consequently, the Court of Appeals' conclusion (that the Information alleges the willfulness 
element of the offense) is also incorrect. 
In this case, the Information omitted the willfulness element of the offense by only 
alleging that Mr. Loftis "did actually, intentionally and unlawfully commit a traumatic injury 
upon the person of Kim Richards[.]" Moreover, the specific intent to cause a traumatic injury 
cannot be discerned by the factual recitation "by punching the victim in the face and head, 
pulling her by her hair and strangling her by the neck[.]" CR 21-22. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals' analysis in Sohm as to the sufficiency of the charging 
document should not be followed. Instead, the Court should follow the two-part analysis set 
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forth in Jones and find that: 1) the correct code section was not alleged in the Information and 2) 
no facts were set forth which, in any form or by fair construction, can be found to have alleged 
that Mr. Loftis willfully inflicted a traumatic injury. Accordingly, the trial court did not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction to sentence for a felony offense. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the judgment and sentence and 
remand for a sentence on the misdemeanor charge of simple battery. 
Respectfully submitted this qrv.. day of October, 2012. 
~""-s~~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Kirk Loftis 
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